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Casebriefs
THE PROOF IS IN THE NEW PUDDING: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
REMOVES “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION FROM THE PRIMA
FACIE CASE FOR TITLE VII RETALIATION
CLAIMS IN CARVALHO-GREVIOUS v.
DELAWARE STATE UNIVERSITY
THALLIA MALESPIN*
“A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.”1
I. YOU BETTER TALK THE TALK AND WALK THE WALK: AN INTRODUCTION
TO TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
In one form or another, we have all been told to “prove it.”2  From
accusing a sibling of stealing your clothes to alleging corporate espionage
by a Fortune 500 company, accusations are nothing of substance until they
are proven.3  For Title VII retaliation plaintiffs, problems arise in knowing
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to, liked me through it, too.  I would also like to thank my parents, Rick and
Ivette—who taught me to work hard for everything we want and have; my sisters,
Katya and Iliana—who remind me how to throw myself wholly into my passions;
my brother, Ricardo—who inspires me to take on challenges no one expects; and
my pets, Boomer and Carrie—who never leave me without a cuddle in a time of
need.  Finally, to the members of the Villanova Law Review, I thank you for your
help and support throughout the writing and editing process of this Casebrief.
1. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 116
(Open Court Pub. Co., 1912).
2. See Lauren Rinere, It is not Enough to Say Someone is Wrong—Prove It!,
THOUGHT CATALOG (Mar. 5, 2015), https://thoughtcatalog.com/lauren-rinere/
2015/03/it-is-not-enough-to-say-someone-is-wrong-prove-it/ [https://perma.cc/
D8S3-5DXP] (stating disagreement is not enough and encouraging merited posi-
tions based on proof); see also Prove – Idioms by the Free Dictionary, FREE DICTIONARY,
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/prove [https://perma.cc/PLK6-CKZC]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (explaining meaning of “fend and prove” idiom); Proof
is in the Pudding, FREE DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/
proof+is+in+the+pudding [https://perma.cc/WM8Q-BDCC] (last visited Nov. 15,
2018) (explaining meaning of “proof is in the pudding” to mean looking at evi-
dence to determine facts).  To “fend and prove” means “to argue and defend a
point or opinion.” Id.
3. See Tarana, Stop Trying to Boycott Snapchat, There’s No Proof that the CEO Called
India Poor, THE TIMELINERS (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.thetimeliners.com/stop-
trying-boycott-snapchat-theres-no-proof-ceo-called-india-poor [Permalink unavaila-
ble] (“While these are ominous accusations, what they are until they’ve been
proved or thrown out by the court is just that—accusations. Not facts.”); see also
(803)
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exactly how to prove their employers retaliated against them.4  To succeed
on a retaliation claim, Title VII requires plaintiffs to establish (1) they en-
gaged in a protected activity—such as making a complaint about discrimi-
nation, (2) they suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the
presence of a causal connection between the protected activity and ad-
verse action.5
If one thing is certain, however, it is that a “smoking gun” of direct
evidence establishing that causal connection is difficult to come by.6
Thus, employees typically proceed with circumstantial evidence when at-
tempting to prove causation in Title VII retaliation claims and do so under
a burden-shifting framework.7  First, employees must establish the three
elements of their prima facie case, alleging retaliation for engaging in the
protected activity as the cause for the adverse employment action; estab-
lishing this prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of retalia-
tion.8  After an employee has established a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to the employer who has the opportunity to produce a
nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.9  In the final
shift of the framework, the employee, in response to the nonretaliatory
reason, may introduce evidence demonstrating the employer’s reasoning
Nathan Bomey, Volkswagon CEO Martin Winterkorn Resigns Amid Scandal, USA TODAY
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2015/09/23/
volkswagen-emissions-scandal-martin-winterkorn/72673028/ [https://perma.cc/
PZM2-JNQN] (“To be sure, there’s no proof that Winterkorn himself knew about
the [fraud]”).  In Bomey’s article, he discusses the impact of Volkswagon’s CEO’s
resignation despite there being no proof of any wrongdoing on his part. See id.
The scandal led to his resignation despite the EPA’s announcement that it had no
proof he knew of the fraudulent acts of the company. See id.
4. See Katherine Stark Todd, But-For Nassar, There Would Not Be a Causation
Conundrum in Title VII Retaliation Litigation: How University of Texas Southwest Medical
Center v. Nassar Makes it Harder for Employees to Prevail, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 288, 290 (2016) (stating employee plaintiffs face confusion in proving cau-
sation for retaliation claims because the burden of proof differs from the burden
in discrimination claims).
5. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017)
(listing elements for plaintiffs to prove retaliation at prima facie stage of case). See
generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018) (anti-retali-
ation provision).
6. See Elizabeth Bloch, Meet the New Boss—Same as the Old Boss: A Look at Foster
v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Title VII Retaliation Claims Post-Nassar, 43
S.U. L. REV. 217, 222 (2016) (indicating employees suing under Title VII typically
do not have direct evidence of retaliatory intent and must prove causation
otherwise).
7. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establish-
ing burden-shifting framework requiring plaintiff to prove prima facie case, defen-
dant’s rebuttal, and plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion); Bloch, supra note 6,
at 222 (noting employees without direct evidence proceed under burden-shifting
framework).
8. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (describing framework and be-
ginning with prima facie stage with burden on employee-plaintiff).
9. See id. (asserting burden shifts to employer to provide legitimate,
nonretaliatory motive for adverse employment action).
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was merely pretextual to the adverse employment action—ultimately, if
pretext is proven, the employer will be held liable at trial.10
While the burden-shifting framework is used throughout the entire
life of litigation, it is particularly relevant and helpful for employees in
surviving defensive motions for summary judgment, where employers typi-
cally argue employees have failed to meet their burden of production.11
Employees initiate their prima facie case in the pleading stage of litigation
and proceed to produce evidence to support their prima facie case
throughout the discovery phase.12  Although employers can produce their
own evidence to show nonretaliatory motive, employers often respond to
an employee’s prima facie case by filing for a motion to dismiss or motion
for summary judgment.13  In addressing these motions, causation is at the
root of the issue in determining whether employees have sufficiently estab-
lished their prima facie case, and whether they can proceed to trial to face
their ultimate burden of persuasion.14
Despite the importance in establishing causation in retaliation claims,
neither the Title VII statutes nor the judicial burden-shifting framework
address the standard of causation required in retaliation claims.15  Thus,
10. See id. at 804 (stating plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to rebut
employer’s reasoning by providing evidence that employer’s reason was merely
pretext).
11. See, e.g., Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir.
2017) (denying employer-defendant’s motion for summary judgment because em-
ployee-plaintiff had sufficiently established prima facie case in burden-shifting
framework); see also Simone R. D. Francis, Third Circuit Substitutes “Likely Reason” for
“But For” at Summary Judgment Stage of Retaliation Case, OGLETREE DEAKINS: OUR IN-
SIGHTS (Apr. 7, 2017), https://ogletree.com/shared-content/content/blog/2017/
april/third-circuit-substitutes-likely-reason-for-but-for-at-summary-judgment-stage-
of-retaliation-case [https://perma.cc/4MHF-S8KL] (noting that a lower causation
standard would make it easier for employees to survive motions for summary
judgment)
12. See Steven R. Semler, Hijacking of Title VII Employment Discrimination Plain-
tiffs On the Way to the Jury, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 49, 60 (2014) (discussing
burden-shifting framework and its flexibility in allowing employees to plead and
then “create an evidentiary inference in favor of the plaintiff” with sufficient evi-
dence up to the summary judgment stage).
13. See Todd, supra note 4, at 311 (noting that retaliation claims are deter-
mined at the summary judgment phase of litigation when employers attack em-
ployees’ causation in the prima facia case); Alix Valenti, University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar: Will Plaintiffs’ Claims of Retaliation Be More
Difficult to Prove?, 16 ATLANTIC L.J. 95, 112–13 (2014) (discussing typical retaliation
claim and noting employers typically file motions for summary judgment in re-
sponse to employees’ prima facia case); see also, e.g., Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at
256 (noting employer-defendant filed for a motion for summary judgment in re-
sponse to employee-plaintiff’s prima facie case).
14. See Todd, supra note 4, at 311 (“Retaliation cases in particular are usually
won or lost at the summary judgment phase by plaintiff’s counsel demonstrating,
or employer’s counsel attacking, causation.”). See generally Semler, supra note 12, at
58–78 (discussing Title VII claims and how summary judgment is used as a tool to
prevent plaintiffs from reaching a factfinder).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nas-
sar, 570 U.S. 338, 351–57 (2013) (addressing statutory interpretation of Title VII’s
3
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in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,16 when the Su-
preme Court announced that Title VII retaliation claims require employ-
ees to meet a burden of “but-for” causation, the new standard threw a
wrench in the burden-shifting framework.17  Ultimately, without clarifica-
tion of how the “but-for” standard should be applied to the burden-shift-
ing framework, the new standard led to a circuit split in the interpretation
of the Court’s decision.18
Some circuits have asserted that employees must prove but-for causa-
tion at the prima facie stage of the burden-shifting framework—impacting
employees’ ability to survive summary judgment.19  Others have stated the
“new” but-for causation standard does not change the burden-shifting
framework at all, but rather, only addresses the plaintiff’s ultimate burden
phrase “because of” in retaliation statute). But see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018)
(“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.”).  The discrimination provision of Title VII provides what is known as
the “motivating factor” causation standard. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.  Nonethe-
less, because the provision does not state retaliation as a potential motivating fac-
tor, the Supreme Court determined the “motivating factor” standard does not
apply to retaliation claims under Title VII. See id.
16. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
17. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362 (“The text, structure, and history of Title VII
demonstrate that a plaintiff making a retaliation claim under § 2000e–3(a) must
establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse
action by the employer.”) (emphasis added). See generally Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E.
Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250–51 n.10 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing circuit split surround-
ing impact of Nassar on burden-shifting framework); Todd, supra note 4, at 304–12
(discussing aftermath of Nassar decision and confusion surrounding factual causa-
tion in employment retaliation cases).
18. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360 (concluding Title VII retaliation claims require
proof that retaliation was the but-for cause of adverse employment action); Foster,
787 F.3d at 250–51 (stating circuit courts are split on implications of Nassar on
prima facie case of burden-shifting framework); see also Bloch, supra note 6, at
242–43 (addressing circuit split regarding Nassar’s impact on burden-shifting
framework and prima facie stage).  The Nassar court failed to address the burden-
shifting framework and announced the “but-for” causation standard without grant-
ing guidance to the effect on the framework. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.  The
circuit split revolves around the placement of “but-for” causation in the burden-
shifting framework. See Alec Chappell, An Onerous Burden: The Impact of Nassar
Upon McDonnell Douglas in the Eleventh Circuit, 67 MERCER L. REV. 997, 1018
(2016).  Those who support placing the burden in the prima facie stage urge the
importance of dismissing frivolous claims. See id.  On the other side of the debate,
proponents of placing the burden in the pretext stage argue plaintiffs with merito-
rious claims will be prevented from seeing a jury if they have too much of a burden
early on and advocate for preserving the traditional burden-shifting framework.
See id.
19. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 ( Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (addressing prima facie case of retaliation claim and finding plaintiff did
not meet “but-for” causation).
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of persuasion at trial.20  In Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University,21
the Third Circuit held that at the prima facie stage—and to survive sum-
mary judgment—employees need only produce enough evidence to justify
an inference that their protected activity was the “likely reason” for an
adverse employment action.22  The Third Circuit continued and held that
the Supreme Court’s “but-for” standard only applies to plaintiffs’ ultimate
burden of persuasion, when plaintiffs must convince the factfinder that
they are entitled to Title VII relief at trial.23
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit’s holding in Carvalho-Grevi-
ous, arguing the decision promotes the spirit of Title VII by providing a
less onerous burden for plaintiffs in retaliation claims at the summary
judgment stage of litigation, despite the uncertainty of how the Third Cir-
cuit’s new standard will be applied in later cases.24  Part II of this Casebrief
reviews Title VII, the development of retaliation case law, and the growing
circuit split surrounding “but-for” causation’s place in the burden-shifting
framework.25  Part III focuses on the facts, procedural history, and hold-
ing in Carvalho-Grevious.26  Part IV argues the Third Circuit’s holding is
employee-friendly, provides for judicial efficiency, and promotes the core
spirit of Title VII retaliation.27  Part IV also addresses the ambiguity and
implications of the “likely reason” standard in future retaliation cases, of-
fering advice to litigants on both sides of the aisle.28  Finally, Part V sum-
marizes the impact of Carvalho-Grevious on the changing tides of Title
VII.29
20. See, e.g., Foster, 787 F.3d at 251 (concluding “but-for” causation is not re-
quired in prima facie stage and does not change the function of the burden-shift-
ing framework).
21. 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017).
22. See id. at 259 (establishing plaintiffs need to show protected activity was
“likely reason” for adverse employment action); Francis, supra note 11 (summariz-
ing Carvalho-Grevious case and key takeaways from new standard).
23. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258–59 (discussing Nassar as clarifying
plaintiffs’ ultimate burden of persuasion).
24. For a discussion of why the removal of “but-for” at the prima facie stage is
more favorable to employee-plaintiffs, see infra notes 132–48 and accompanying
text.  For a discussion of the future implications of the “likely reason” standard, see
infra notes 149–56 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the existing Title VII retaliation law, and judicial devel-
opment of causation standards, see infra notes 30–81 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the facts, procedural history, and opinion in Carvalho-
Grevious, see infra notes 82–127 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the positive implications arising from the removal of
“but-for” causation at the prima facie stage, see infra notes 128–48 and accompany-
ing text.
28. For a discussion of the implications of Carvalho-Grevious on the prima facie
case, summary judgment, and litigation in general, see infra notes 149–86 and ac-
companying text.
29. For a further discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit’s holding, see
infra notes 187–94 and accompanying text.
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II. EVERYONE HAS SOMETHING TO PROVE: A BACKGROUND OF TITLE VII
RETALIATION CLAIMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE CAUSATION STANDARD
Employees face adverse employment actions all the time, but it is un-
likely every adverse action is the result of unlawful retaliation.30  Thus,
proof of causation is the key to retaliation claims.31  Nevertheless, the de-
velopment of Title VII jurisprudence has been less than clear on how a
plaintiff may prove causation.32  As a result, courts have accepted direct,
indirect, and circumstantial evidence while also allowing plaintiffs to pro-
ceed under different frameworks to prove their claims.33  Even with the
Supreme Court’s requirement of “but-for” causation, varying interpreta-
tions of the law have led to different standards throughout the lower
courts.34  To illustrate the intricacies of proving causation, this section re-
views the development of Title VII retaliation jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court’s decision requiring “but-for” causation, and other relevant circuit
court opinions interpreting that decision.35
30. See generally Bureau of Labor Statistics, USDL-18-0377, News Release: Job
Openings and Labor Turnover – December 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Feb. 6, 2018,
10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VF5Q-JYG8] (finding approximately 1.6 million people were laid off or discharged
in December 2017).  The statistics address all reasons for separations in employ-
ment but noted that a little over one percent of separations are due to layoffs and
discharges. See id.
31. See 5 EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, Proof of Causation § 10:35,
(Westlaw 2018) (noting employees facing adverse employment action cannot sur-
vive summary judgment without some kind of causal link showing retaliation).
32. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 218 (describing different frameworks used to
prove causation under retaliation provision of Title VII).  Employees suing for re-
taliation may be able to proceed with direct or indirect evidence of retaliatory
animus, known as the mixed-motive framework. See id. at 219.  This includes show-
ing that an employer acting in retaliation was at least a motivating factor in making
the decision leading to the adverse employment action. See id.  Typically, this is
done with conduct or statements showing retaliation as a motive. See id. at 219–20.
Some employees may also proceed under the “pretext theory,” by using the bur-
den-shifting framework without direct evidence. See id. at 222–27.  Even when the
Supreme Court announced the requisite standard of causation, at least one critic
has noted the decision led to more confusion regarding causation in Title VII
retaliation claims. See Todd, supra note 4, at 304–11.
33. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 218 (summarizing mixed-motive framework
where employees use direct and indirect evidence to prove causation and explain-
ing burden-shifting framework that may be completed with circumstantial evi-
dence or without any direct evidence at all).
34. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017)
(stating circuit courts are split on how “but-for” causation standard should be ap-
plied to burden-shifting framework); see, e.g., Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787
F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding “but-for” causation does not apply to bur-
den-shifting framework and using a “real reason” standard); EEOC v. Ford Motor
Co., 782 F.3d 753, 770 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiffs must prove “but-for”
causation at prima facie stage of burden-shifting framework).
35. For further discussion on the development of Title VII retaliation juris-
prudence, the Supreme Court’s decision requiring “but-for” causation, and other
relevant circuit court opinions, see infra notes 44–81 and accompanying text.
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A. Causes and Consequences: An Overview of Title VII Requirements
The Civil Rights Acts of 1964—better known as Title VII—protects
employees from discrimination based on race, religion, color, and other
protected traits.36  In addition to that core provision, Title VII makes it
unlawful for employers to discriminate against individuals who complain
of, oppose, or participate in proceedings about prohibited discrimina-
tion—in other words, to retaliate.37  Retaliation protection is essential to
allow employees to come forward and report incidents they believe are
discrimination.38  By allowing effective reporting, the protection against
retaliation is a “necessary part” of Title VII enforcement.39
The statutory language of the retaliation provision prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against any employee because that employee has
opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII.40  The cause of action
that stems from this language requires plaintiffs to prove they engaged in
protected activity and the employer discriminated against them because of
their participation in that protected activity.41  While Title VII states the
36. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). See also Tracy Bateman Farrell, et
al., Generally, 45A AM. JUR. 2d Job Discrimination § 1 (2017) (providing overview of
Title VII provisions).
37. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018). See also Frederick T. Golder &
David R. Golder, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of the 1964—Retaliation, LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 4.20 (3d ed. 2017) (summarizing
retaliation provision of Title VII).  This protection against retaliation is an essential
function in securing a workplace free from discrimination. See Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 363 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining
fear of retaliation is why people who experience discrimination stay silent and pro-
tection from retaliation is essential to reach goals of Title VII).
38. See Henry L. Chambers, The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII:
Strengthening it or Killing it?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1180–81 (2014) (“Without retalia-
tion protection, employees would have a difficult time protecting their own em-
ployment, and very few would engage in actions that might protect the
employment rights of others.”).
39. See id. at 1180–81 (arguing retaliation protection is essential to enforcing
Title VII); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing
importance of Title VII retaliation protection and emphasizing that employees
need protection for reporting discrimination).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation provision of Title VII).  The retalia-
tion provision states specifically:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an
employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job train-
ing programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organ-
ization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for
membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, pro-
ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. See, e.g., Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 2013)
(describing retaliation claims and elements that plaintiff must establish).  The re-
taliation prima facie case consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in
7
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prohibition on retaliation, the statute does not elaborate on what “be-
cause” means or what causation standard is appropriate.42  Nonetheless,
without statutory guidance, the courts took the lead in providing
frameworks for causation, describing acceptable means of evidence, and
establishing appropriate burdens of proof.43
B. A Lost Cause: The Development of Causation in Title VII
Retaliation Claims
Although the elements of a Title VII retaliation claim seem simple
enough, many employees face difficulty in proving their cases at trial.44
This difficulty stems from the inability to obtain direct evidence of retalia-
tory motive.45  Considering most employers who retaliate do not state
activity protected under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s exercise of her protected rights
was known to defendant; (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently
taken against the employee or the employee was subjected to severe or pervasive
retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection be-
tween the protected activity and the adverse employment action or harassment.
See Moore v. Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006).  Before filing a
claim, a plaintiff must have exhausted administrative remedies with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See Tracy Bateman Farrell, et al.,
45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2009 (2017).  Typically, plaintiffs must exhaust
administrative remedies for each individual discriminatory or retaliatory act. See id.
These administrative remedies include timely filing of a charge with the EEOC and
the receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the agency. See id.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (prohibiting retaliation for engaging in protected
activities); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 (addressing definition of “because” in
retaliation statute and comparing it to language in discrimination provision and
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)).
43. See Alan Rupe, Jason Stitt & Mark Kanaga, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the
Burden of Proof in Title VII Retaliation Actions, 83-Jan J. KAN. B.A. 24, 26–28 (2014)
(summarizing history of Title VII retaliation and development of causation
through statutory language and court decisions).  For further discussion of the
history of Title VII retaliation causation, see infra notes 44-69 and accompanying
text.
44. See Kimberly A. Pathman, Protecting Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision in the
Wake of University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. 475, 483–84 (2015) (describing rise of burden-shifting framework to help
plaintiffs having problems proving covert discrimination or retaliation); Tom Spig-
gle, New Summary Judgment Standard for Retaliation Cases, SPIGGLE LAW: EMPLOYMENT
BLOG, http://www.spigglelaw.com/employment-blog/new-summary-judgment-
standard-retaliation-cases/# [https://perma.cc/YX4J-KJHM] (last visited Nov. 15,
2018) (noting plaintiffs rarely have direct evidence of retaliation and burden-shift-
ing framework’s purpose without direct evidence). But see David S. Sherwyn & Zev
J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence that Retaliation Claims Are Unlike Other Employment Dis-
crimination Claims, 16 CORNELL HOSPITALITY REP. 3, 12 (2016) (arguing once retali-
ation claim comes before jury, finding in favor of plaintiff is more likely).
According to Sherman, jurors are more likely to infer retaliation when presented
with evidence because most people can relate to a desire to retaliate against some-
one who has wronged them. See id.  Sherman conducted a study amongst jurors
and found that in retaliation cases, jurors are more likely to rule in favor of the
plaintiff by fifty-nine percent. See id.
45. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 222 (noting employees without direct evidence
usually proceed through burden-shifting framework).
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their retaliatory intention in implementing an adverse employment ac-
tion, most employees proceeding to court will only have circumstantial
evidence to support their claim.46  Thus, the Supreme Court created a
burden-shifting framework to provide aggrieved employees with another
avenue to succeed.47
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,48 the Supreme Court established a
three-step burden-shifting framework.49  The framework first places the
burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, then shifts the bur-
den to the employer to establish a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action, and finally places the burden back on the
plaintiff to establish the employer’s reasoning is merely pretext.50  Regard-
less of how and when the evidence is presented, the ultimate burden of
persuasion always lies with the plaintiff.51
The burden-shifting framework has become an essential part of Title
VII retaliation jurisprudence, with most plaintiffs using it as a vehicle to
present evidence in an organized manner to reach the ultimate conclu-
46. See Timothy A. Ogden, Shifting Burdens and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Why McDonnell Douglas Should Apply to the ADA, 29 IND. L. REV. 179, 186-87
(1995) (noting most employees will lack insight into discriminatory or retaliatory
motives of employer in implementing adverse employment action); Lawrence D.
Rosenthal, Timing Isn’t Everything: Establishing a Title VII Retaliation Prima Facie Case
After University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 69 SMU L. REV.
143, 152 (2016) (focusing on plaintiffs’ burden in proving causation and noting
most will use temporal proximity between protected activity and adverse employ-
ment action to create inference of retaliation).
47. See Ogden, supra note 46, at 186–87 (discussing purposes of McDonnell
Douglas’s burden-shifting framework including allowing plaintiffs to prevail with-
out providing evidence of retaliatory animus); see also Semler, supra note 12, at 60
(reasoning Supreme Court recognized absence of direct evidence in retaliation
claims and created burden-shifting framework to establish an inference of discrim-
ination or retaliation); Spiggle, supra note 44 (noting most plaintiffs fail to have
direct evidence of retaliation).  In addition to providing another avenue for relief,
McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework is effective for requiring plaintiffs
to eliminate nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action and
because it provides efficiency by allowing employers to avoid trial and litigation by
filing for summary judgment or motion to dismiss when the plaintiff fails to make a
prima facie case. See Ogden, supra note 46, at 186–87.
48. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
49. See id. at 802 (establishing burden-shifting framework).
50. See id. (describing burden-shifting process under pretext theory).  It is un-
clear how McDonnell-Douglas became the dominant avenue for retaliation in the
federal circuit courts, as the original case was a discrimination case. See id.  Over
time, the framework was used in every kind of Title VII case and many courts and
scholars have reasoned this is because of the “kind” of evidence that the plaintiff
may come forward with. See generally Ogden, supra note 46, at 183–87 (explaining
purposes of burden-shifting framework).
51. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, et al., 45C AM. JUR. 2D Three-Part Proof Scheme;
“McDonnell Douglas” Framework § 2403 (2017) (summarizing burden-shifting frame-
work and its role from motion to dismiss to trial).  Once at trial, the burden-shift-
ing framework is no longer considered, and the ultimate question is whether the
plaintiff has produced enough evidence to convince a jury he or she suffered from
retaliation. See id.
9
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sion of retaliation.52  The framework is typically viewed as favorable to em-
ployees although plaintiffs must still meet the ultimate burden of
persuasion by providing evidence of pretext at trial.53  Because most retali-
ation plaintiffs rely on the burden-shifting framework, it is essential to un-
derstand the burden of persuasion and standard of causation a plaintiff
must establish when operating under that framework.54
C. Less Isn’t Always More: The Supreme Court Requires “But-For” Causation
Without a clear standard of causation provided within the Title VII
retaliation provision, the Supreme Court took to statutory interpretation
and addressed the causation issue in University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar.55  Despite the retaliation provision’s failure to address
causation, the discrimination provision of Title VII provided guidance to
courts in retaliation cases prior to Nassar.56  The discrimination provision
prohibits conduct in which “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice”—a lower causation
standard.57  Considering this provision, and without law implying other-
wise, courts regularly applied this “lower” causation standard in retaliation
cases.58
Despite this regular practice, the Court determined that the discrimi-
nation provision’s causation standard did not apply to retaliation claims
52. See id. (describing how burden-shifting framework presents evidence in
orderly fashion and is not meant to be rigid).
53. See, e.g., Semler, supra note 12, at 60 (noting usual circumstance of plain-
tiffs not having access to direct evidence of discrimination and thus proceeding
under burden-shifting framework as an additional avenue to relief); see also Ogden,
supra note 46, at 187 (discussing common circumstance of employees lacking di-
rect eyewitness testimony of retaliation or discrimination and benefit of burden-
shifting framework to provide another avenue for relief).
54. See Semler, supra note 12, at 59 (stating most cases lack direct evidence
and burden-shifting framework’s use in those cases).  For a discussion of how
courts have interpreted a strict “but-for” causation standard and its effect on the
burden-shifting framework see infra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
55. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018); see also Rupe, supra note 43, at 27 (not-
ing courts applied motivating factor causation standard to retaliation and discrimi-
nations after amendment to Title VII).  Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the
Fifth Circuit held that the appropriate causation standard is the motivating factor
standard used for discrimination cases and codified in section 2000e-2(m). See
Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
57. See § 2000e-2(m) (providing motivating factor standard); see also Nassar,
570 U.S. at 348–49 (addressing causation standard in discrimination cases and stat-
ing that it is “of course, a lessened causation standard”).
58. See Pathman, supra note 44, at 487 (discussing history of burden-shifting
framework and application of causation standard in light of discrimination stan-
dard in Title VII).
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because of the construction of the discrimination provision.59  Specifically,
the discrimination provision, which provides the lesser motivating-factor
standard, only addresses unlawful employment practices in five prohibited
categories—those that are based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin.60  More importantly, the discrimination provision explicitly ex-
cludes any language referring to retaliation.61  Thus, the Court deter-
mined, despite Title VII’s inclusion of retaliation as an “unlawful
employment action,” it could not “conclude that what Congress omitted
from the statute is nevertheless within its scope.”62
Moreover, because the Title VII retaliation provision’s causation lan-
guage is identical to the language in the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), the Court relied on its precedent in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.,63 where it interpreted the phrase “because of” in the
relevant ADEA provision.64  Thus, looking only to the retaliation provi-
sion’s language and its precedent in Gross, the Court held the causation
standard for retaliation claims must be analyzed under traditional tort
principles and a plaintiff has the onerous burden of proving “but-for” cau-
sation.65  Meaning, the plaintiff must prove that had the plaintiff not en-
59. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 351–54 (reasoning retaliation provision is separate
from discrimination provision and causation standard cannot transcend to affect
retaliation requirements).
60. See § 2000e-2(m); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 353 (noting that motivating-
factor provision “begins by referring to ‘unlawful employment practices’” but sub-
sequently addresses only “five of the seven prohibited discriminatory actions”).
The Court also noted that the first five prohibited discriminatory actions are based
on “personal characteristics.” See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 347.  Whereas, the last two
prohibited discriminatory actions “are not wrongs based on personal traits but
rather types of protected employee conduct.” See id.  The Court implied that these
different categories of prohibited discriminatory actions lead to the difference in
causation provisions and the different standards of causation within each. See id. at
348.
61. See § 2000e-2(m) (omitting two categories of prohibited discriminatory ac-
tions based on protected employee conduct); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 353 (“The
text of § 2000e-2(m) says nothing about retaliation claims.”).  The Court stated
that this omission “indicates Congress’ intent to confine [the discrimination provi-
sion’s] coverage to only those types of employment practices [based on the five
personal characteristics].” See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 353.
62. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 353 (citing Gardner v. Collins, 7 L. Ed. 347 (1829))
(“What the legislative intention was, can be derived only from the words they have
used; and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable import of these words.”).
63. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
64. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 350 (detailing Court’s reasoning in Gross defining
“because of”).
65. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352 (“Given the lack of any meaningful textual
difference between the text in this statute and the one in Gross, the proper conclu-
sion here, as in Gross, is that Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the
desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”);
Valenti, supra note 13, at 106–07 (summarizing Nassar decision and implications
resulting from “but-for” causation standard); Gregory Keating, Greg Coulter, Mer-
edith Kaufman & Catherine Pearson, Too Little, Too Late: The Supreme Court Adopts
But-For Causation for Title VII Retaliation Claims, LITTLER INSIGHT: IN-DEPTH DISCUS-
SION (June 25, 2013), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/too-
11
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gaged in the protected activity, the employer would not have engaged in
the adverse employment action.66
Although the decision seemed to provide a standard that could be
consistently applied, the Court’s holding failed to address one issue: the
predominant burden-shifting framework used by most retaliation plain-
tiffs.67  The Court likely did not address the burden-shifting framework
because the plaintiff in Nassar proceeded to trial with direct evidence of
retaliation.68  Thus, the plaintiff’s use of a different framework caused am-
biguity regarding the decision’s effect on the unaddressed—yet, widely
used—burden-shifting framework.69
D. But-For Nassar, There’d Be No Circuit Split: Applying “But-For” to the
Burden-Shifting Framework
With the lack of harmonization between Nassar and the burden-shift-
ing framework, lower courts have scrambled to put the pieces together.70
Several circuit courts have addressed whether the “but-for” standard
changes any element of the burden-shifting framework.71  A majority of
little-too-late-supreme-court-adopts-causation-title-vii [https://perma.cc/A8TA-
TB58] (noting “but-for” causation is exacting standard for plaintiffs but will not
deter plaintiffs from suing employers for retaliation).
66. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating complainant
must now prove “that the employer would not have taken the adverse employment
action but for a design to retaliate”).
67. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (addressing plaintiff’s claim based on di-
rect evidence of retaliation and not addressing burden-shifting framework).
68. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 239 (explaining Nassar required “but-for” causa-
tion because case involved direct evidence in “mixed-motive” case); see also Foster
v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Clearly, Nassar
significantly altered the causation standard for claims based on direct evidence of
retaliatory animus by rejecting the ‘mixed motive’ theory of liability for retaliation
claims.”).
69. See generally Bloch, supra note 6, at 242 (explaining disagreement amongst
circuit courts on Nassar standard implications for burden-shifting framework).
70. See Chappell, supra note 18, at 1005 (discussing aftermath of Nassar and
circuit courts’ differing interpretations). Compare Ward v. Jewell, 772 F.3d 1199,
1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating Supreme Court established burden as “but-for” cau-
sation in prima facie stage of burden-shifting framework), with Feist v. La., Dept. of
Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating
plaintiff proves pretext “by showing that the adverse action would not have oc-
curred ‘but-for’ the employer’s retaliatory motive”).  With a circuit split in place, it
is possible that the Supreme Court will take up the issue in the future. See Doug
Lederman, Court Sides with Professor on Retaliation Claim Against Delaware State, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/
03/22/court-sides-professor-retaliation-claim-against-delaware-state [https://per
ma.cc/7YM6-V5PX] (discussing circuit split may lead to Supreme Court review is-
sue in future).
71. See Foster, 787 F.3d at 251 (summarizing and listing circuit courts address-
ing whether Nassar affects burden-shifting framework and summarizing disagree-
ment in decisions).  The Fourth Circuit described the case law amongst the circuit
courts as “muddled” and even listed contradictory opinions from the same circuit
court. See id. at 251 n.10.
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courts have held Nassar requires plaintiffs to prove “but-for” causation in
the prima facie stage of the framework.72  On the other hand, a minority
of courts have held the burden of “but-for” causation belongs in the pre-
text stage of the framework.73
The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits place the “but-for” causation
standard at the prima facie stage of the burden-shifting framework.74
These courts have assuredly placed a more onerous burden on the plain-
tiff before trial.75  When faced with the issue, the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits ruled Nassar does not place the new burden on the plaintiff until the
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 770 (6th Cir. 2015) (ad-
dressing prima facie case of retaliation claim and finding plaintiff did not meet
“but-for” causation).
73. See Kwan v. Andalex Group LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013) (“How-
ever, the but-for causation standard does not alter the plaintiff’s ability to demon-
strate causation at the prima facie stage . . . .”).
74. See Ford, 782 F.3d at 770 (addressing retaliation claim under ADA and
finding Nassar required “but-for” in prima facie stage of burden-shifting frame-
work); Ward, 772 F.3d at 1203 (stating Supreme Court heightened standard at
prima facie stage to “but-for” causation); Butterworth v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Hold-
ings, 581 Fed. App’x. 813, 817 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiff failed to prove
prima facie case without showing of “but-for” causation).
75. See, e.g., Ward, 772 F.3d at 1203 (addressing causal connection of prima
facie case and merely stating “Supreme Court has likened this burden to a showing
of ‘but-for’ causation”).  The circuit courts placing the burden in the prima facie
stage simply state the elements of the prima facie stage and then state the Nassar
standard as the appropriate standard. See id.  Additionally, these courts have not
addressed the fact that the Nassar Court did not speak to the burden-shifting
framework. See id.  Although these courts have not provided too much reasoning
in placing the burden in the prima facie phase, most proponents of doing so advo-
cate the need to dispose of frivolous claims prior to trial to save resources on the
judicial system and accused employers. See Chappell, supra note 18, at 1018–19
(discussing reasons courts believe “but-for” causation belongs in prima facie stage).
However, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), attorneys are re-
quired to certify their representations to the court and essentially assert their filing
of claims is not frivolous or without merit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).  FRCP 11
states:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—
whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney
or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportu-
nity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
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pretext stage.76  Specifically, when establishing pretext, the plaintiff shows
retaliation is the “but-for” cause by placing doubt on the legitimate reason
proffered by the employer.77
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue and held Nassar did
not affect the burden-shifting framework at all.78  Specifically, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned the burden-shifting framework brings the “real reason”
for an adverse employment action to light.79  Relying on this “real reason”
standard, the Fourth Circuit stated the “but-for” standard is the “func-
tional[ ] equivalent” of what is already required under the burden-shifting
framework.80  In Carvalho-Grevious, the Third Circuit favored the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in determining Nassar’s effect on the burden-shifting
framework.81
III. PUT IT TO THE TEST: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ADDRESSES CAUSATION FOR
TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS IN CARVALHO-GREVIOUS V.
DELAWARE STATE UNIVERSITY
In Carvalho-Grevious,82 the Third Circuit relied on the Fourth Circuit’s
reasoning and adopted a new standard for a plaintiff’s prima facie
76. See Feist v. La., Dep’t. of Justice, Office of the Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450,
454 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating plaintiff proves pretext “by showing that the adverse
action would not have occurred but for the employer’s retaliatory motive”); Kwan,
737 F.3d at 845 (2d Cir. 2013) (“However, the but-for causation standard does not
alter the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate causation at the prima facie stage on
summary judgment or at trial indirectly through temporal proximity.”).
77. See Feist, 730 F.3d at 454 (stating plaintiff establishes pretext in burden-
shifting framework by proving adverse action would not have occurred but for em-
ployer’s retaliatory motive); Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846 (stating plaintiff proves “but-
for” causation by placing doubt on employer’s articulated legitimate reason for
adverse employment action).
78. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015)
(equivocating “but-for” causation to “real reason” standard already applied to bur-
den-shifting framework claims); see also Bloch, supra note 6, at 245 (summarizing
Fourth Circuit’s decision reasoning Nassar did not affect burden-shifting
framework).
79. See Foster, 787 F.3d at 252 (stating burden-shifting framework requires pre-
text to reveal employer’s real reason for engaging in adverse employment action).
80. See id. (noting phrasing may be different but meaning of “but-for” and
“real reason” are equivalent standards).
81. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 (refusing to
heighten plaintiff’s burden at prima facie stage in agreement with Fourth Circuit).
The Third Circuit also clarified that Nassar’s “but-for” causation standard is a bur-
den of persuasion whereas the prima facie case is merely a burden of production.
See id.; see also Patrick Dorrian, Justices May Need to Clarify Causation Test for Retalia-
tion Claims, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY LABOR REPORT (Mar. 21, 2017, 7:54 PM),
https://convergenceapi.bna.com/ui/content/articleStandalone/24660765600000
0008/388272?itemGuid=DC067DB2-20C6-49D2-BB5E-7E2852289BCA [https://
perma.cc/S9DL-JJSC] (discussing court’s distinction between burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion).
82. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258 (explaining Nassar addressed plain-
tiff’s ultimate burden and determining whether prima facie case changed as
result).
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case.83  At the prima facie stage, the new standard requires the plaintiff to
show the protected activity was the “likely reason” for the adverse employ-
ment action.84  Ultimately, if proven, the plaintiff survives the defendants’
motion for summary judgment and sees the light of a trial.85
A. Cause for Concern: Facts and Procedure in Carvalho-Grevious
Dr. Millicent Carvalho-Grevious was an associate professor and
chairperson of the Department of Social Work at Delaware State Univer-
sity.86  When she was hired in August 2010, her main duties included lead-
ing the social work program’s reaccreditation effort.87  As part of her
contract, her employment ended on June 30, 2011—although she could
be reappointed.88  As chairperson, Dr. Grevious reported directly to Dean
Austin, who reported to University Provost Thompson.89
From the outset of her employment, Dr. Grevious faced difficulty im-
plementing the reaccreditation process.90  Additionally, she experienced
difficulties with others in the department, leading her to make personnel
changes.91  In particular, Dr. Grevious’s relationship with Dean Austin de-
83. See id. at 259 (“We decline now to heighten the plaintiff’s prima facie
burden to meet her ultimate burden of persuasion.  That is because we agree with
the Fourth Circuit . . . .”).  The Third Circuit also concluded that at the prima facie
stage, a plaintiff need only “produce evidence ‘sufficient to raise the inference that
her protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.’”
See id.
84. See id. (establishing new “likely reason” standard).
85. See id. at 263 (finding plaintiff produced enough evidence to meet new
standard and survive summary judgment).  Despite the court’s holding on the con-
tract issuance retaliation claim, the plaintiff’s other claims of retaliation did not
meet the likely reason standard and were affirmed by the court. See id.
86. See id. at 253 (summarizing terms of employment agreement and timeline
of Dr. Grevious’s hiring).
87. See id. (describing Dr. Grevious’s duties).  Dr. Grevious was responsible for
nine department employees and her reaccreditation duties required her to submit
comprehensive studies and other supporting documentation to the Office of So-
cial Work Accreditation (OSWA) by August 1, 2011. See id.  Although Dr. Grevious
worked on the accreditation process, Provost Thompson was primarily responsible
for the Department’s reaccreditation. See id.
88. See id.  Dr. Grevious’s employment contract is the subject of her retaliation
complaint. See id.  At one point she was offered a renewable contract and after
making EEOC charges, she was issued a nonrenewable contract. See id. at 255.  For
further discussion of Dr. Grevious’s retaliation claim, see infra notes 102–06 and
accompanying text.
89. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 253 (detailing reporting hierarchy re-
garding Dr. Grevious’s position).
90. See id. at 253–54 (describing department’s lack of structure adding diffi-
culty to accreditation process).  Dr. Grevious stated the department was in “com-
plete disarray.” See id.
91. See id. at 254 (listing personal difficulties with several professors and staff
members in department).  Dr. Grevious recommended nonrenewal of two profes-
sors, replaced two of her administrative staff, and terminated a department con-
sultant. See id.  Three of these employees complained to Dean Austin that Dr.
Grevious held “personal grudges” and stated her actions were unprofessional be-
15
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teriorated, and as a result, she complained of his leadership to Provost
Thompson.92  Later, at a meeting with Provost Thompson, Dr. Grevious
alleged Dean Austin made racially discriminatory statements and engaged
in sexist behavior towards her.93  After Dean Austin denied making any
discriminatory remarks, he submitted a formal evaluation of Dr. Grevious
that was largely unfavorable.94
In the midst of her struggles with Dean Austin, Dr. Grevious faced a
faculty vote to determine if she would be reappointed as chairperson for
an additional term.95  Dr. Grevious believed Dean Austin wished to inter-
fere with the faculty vote and his unfavorable review was in retaliation of
her complaint of discrimination to Provost Thompson.96  Nevertheless, at
the vote, the faculty voted to appoint a new chairperson.97  Subsequently,
Dr. Grevious filed a formal complaint against Dean Austin for discrimina-
tion and retaliation for the negative performance evaluation.98
After Dr. Grevious was replaced as chairperson for the following year,
Provost Thompson recommended and issued her a renewable contract.99
Due to pressure in the department’s reaccreditation process, Provost
cause she degraded and belittled them. See id.  Despite these negative complaints,
Dr. Grevious also received some positive feedback from students and senior faculty
as part of her formal evaluation. See id.
92. See id. (describing Dr. Grevious’s complaints to Provost Thompson).  Dr.
Grevious complained to Provost Thompson because she felt that Dean Austin was
hindering the reaccreditation process and advocating to remove her from the de-
partment chair position. See id.
93. See id. (summarizing Dr. Grevious’s first complaint of discrimination).  Al-
though Dr. Grevious had previously complained of Dean Austin’s management
and leadership skills, she first complained of discrimination in January 2011. See
id.  (stating Dean Austin was overtly sexist and his management style was meant to
stop “back biting among women, especially Black women”).
94. See id. (summarizing Dean Austin’s meeting with Provost Thompson at
which time he denied making any discriminatory statements).  The evaluation
stated that Dr. Grevious’s leadership style was a major problem for the department
and rated her as one out of five stars. See id.  Dr. Grevious contested the evaluation
and Dean Austin revised it but only to award her two out of five stars in the leader-
ship category. See id.
95. See id. at 255 (detailing faculty vote against Dr. Grevious).  The Depart-
ment scheduled the vote to take place in February 2011. See id.
96. See id. at 254–55 (describing email sent from Dr. Grevious complaining of
Dean Austin on morning of election).  Dr. Grevious asked Provost Thompson to
insulate the election from any interference from Dean Austin. See id. at 255.  Be-
cause Dr. Grevious could not produce evidence of Dean Austin’s interference,
Provost Thompson allowed the election to go forward. See id.
97. See id. at 255 (noting that including Dr. Grevious, the faculty voted five to
four in favor of appointing a new department chair).
98. See id. (recounting Dr. Grevious’s formal complaint to Office of Provost).
No further action was taken regarding these complaints as Provost found no evi-
dence of any violations. See id.  Later, Dr. Grevious filed another complaint with
University Human Resources Department. See id.
99. See id. (summarizing timeline of events leading to Dr. Grevious’s com-
plaints including the renewable contract employed Dr. Grevious as an associate
professor for the 2011-12 academic year).
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Thompson removed Dr. Grevious from her position as chairperson before
the end of her contract, while still affording her chairperson compensa-
tion for the remainder of her contract.100  As a result, Dr. Grevious filed
her first charge with the EEOC—alleging the early removal was unlawful
retaliation for her complaints against Dean Austin.101
One month later, Provost Thompson changed his recommendation
on Dr. Grevious, revoked her renewable contract, and issued her a termi-
nal contract to expire in 2012.102  The contract revision led Dr. Grevious
to file her second EEOC charge, alleging the terminal contract was issued
in retaliation for filing her initial EEOC charge.103  Specifically, Dr. Grevi-
ous stated Provost Thompson explicitly admitted his decision to issue the
terminal contract was based on her EEOC charge.104  Upon expiration of
the terminal contract, Provost Thompson did not recommend Dr. Grevi-
ous for reappointment for the 2012–13 academic year.105  Following this
decision, Dr. Grevious filed her final EEOC charge, alleging her ultimate
termination was an act of retaliation for her first two EEOC charges.106
Dr. Grevious filed suit in the District of Delaware against the Univer-
sity, the Dean, and the Provost alleging retaliation in violation of Title
VII.107  All three defendants moved for summary judgment claiming Dr.
Grevious failed to establish causation in her retaliation claims.108  The Dis-
100. See id. (stating university social work department deadline for accredita-
tion was impending).  Provost Thompson requested an extension of the reac-
creditation deadline because of the transition between Dr. Grevious and her
successor. See id.  The Office of Social Work Accreditation (OSWA) ultimately de-
nied the request, placing pressure on Provost Thompson to place the new
chairperson in charge and remove Dr. Grevious. See id.  (noting how, soon after
the OSWA’s denial, Dr. Grevious was dismissed as chairperson).
101. See id. (discussing Dr. Grevious’s EEOC charge).
102. See id. at 255 (stating university made its decision to not rehire Dr. Grevi-
ous based on Provost Thompson’s recommendation).
103. See id. at 256 (commenting on Dr. Grevious’s second EEOC charge of
retaliation).
104. See id. at 255–56 (recounting Dr. Grevious’s allegations against Provost
Thompson).  Specifically, Dr. Grevious alleged she met with Provost Thompson to
discuss her new terminal contract and the Provost admitted his decision was not
based on her teaching or professional performance. See id.  Provost Thompson
denied making any statements suggesting he made his decision based on the
EEOC charge and asserted the decision was based on Dr. Grevious’s interpersonal
conflict with others at the university. See id. at 256.
105. See id. at 256 (discussing Dr. Grevious’s ultimate termination and Provost
Thompson’s justification for terminating Dr. Grevious because of her consistent
“inability to work collegially” with others).
106. See id. (recalling events leading to Dr. Grevious’s final EEOC charge of
retaliation).
107. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., No. 13-1386, 2015 WL 5768940,
at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2015) (addressing Dr. Grevious’s claims including her com-
plaints of retaliation solely against Dean Austin and Provost Thompson under 42
U.S.C. § 1981), rev’d Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249 (2017).
108. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 256 (summarizing district court
opinion).
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trict Court relied on Nassar and stated the plaintiff must prove the retalia-
tion was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action.109  The
court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgement, conclud-
ing no reasonable jury could find that, but for Dr. Grevious’s complaints
and EEOC charges, Dr. Grevious would have retained her position or re-
newable contract.110  On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court because its application of “but-for” causation was misplaced.111
B. Causing a Stir: Third Circuit Upholds Burden-Shifting and Creates
a New Causation Standard
The Third Circuit in Carvalho-Grevious reversed the district court’s de-
cision in part, with disagreement focused on the appropriate causation
standard.112  Because Dr. Grevious relied on indirect evidence to prove
her case, the court referenced the widely-used burden-shifting frame-
work.113  Considering the Nassar decision, the court addressed how the
plaintiff’s prima facie case could survive summary judgment.114
The court began by analyzing a plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persua-
sion in a Title VII retaliation claim and then worked backwards to decide
what standard applies to the prima facie case.115  The court discussed its
precedent in using the burden-shifting framework and noted that it typi-
cally requires plaintiffs, upon proving pretext, to prove retaliation was the
109. See id. (explaining district court’s reasoning); see also Carvalho-Grevious,
2015 WL 5768940, at *4 (declaring Nassar’s “but-for” standard should be applied in
prima facie stage).
110. See Carvalho-Grevious, 2015 WL 5768940, at *5 (“As a matter of law, Grevi-
ous cannot show that her harassment complaints were the but-for cause of the
Defendants’ actions.”).
111. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 253 (reversing district court regarding
contract revision claim).  Although the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s
placement of “but-for” causation, it only reversed summary judgment on Dr. Grevi-
ous’s contract revision claim. See id.  The court affirmed summary judgment for
the University on Dr. Grevious’s chairperson claim noting that, because she re-
ceived notice of her termination as chairperson on the same day she filed a formal
complaint with human resources, the termination was not suggestive of retaliatory
motive. See id. at 260.
112. See id. at 256, 259 (discussing district court’s reasoning and concluding
plaintiff’s prima facie case should not be onerous).
113. See id. at 257 (“A plaintiff seeking to prove her case through indirect
evidence, as Dr. Grevious seeks to here, may do so by applying the familiar . . .
burden-shifting framework.” (citing Daniels v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 776
F.3d 181, 198–99 (3d. Cir. 2015))).
114. See id. (“The question before us is what a plaintiff must bring as part of
her prima facie case of retaliation to survive a motion for summary judgment in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar, which held that ‘Title VII
retaliation claims must be proven according to traditional principles of but-for
causation.’”).
115. See id. at 258 (summarizing Third Circuit precedent regarding plaintiffs’
ultimate burden of persuasion in retaliation claims using burden-shifting
framework).
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“real reason” for the adverse employment action.116  Despite differing
terms, the court stated that its “real reason” standard and Nassar’s “but-
for” standard were “functionally the same.”117  Therefore, because Nassar
did not change a plaintiff’s ultimate burden, the court discussed whether
the ultimate burden differed from the burden at the prima facie stage.118
The court reasoned if plaintiffs could meet their ultimate burden in
the prima facie phase, then there would be no need to move to the pretext
phase—wholly eliminating the burden-shifting framework.119  The court
noted that if the Supreme Court in Nassar intended to essentially elimi-
nate the burden-shifting framework rooted in forty years of precedent,
then it would have stated its intention explicitly.120  Thus, the Third Cir-
cuit relied on its own precedent in reasoning that a plaintiff has a lesser
causal burden at the prima facie stage, which does not include proving
“but-for” causation.121  In refusing to implement a more onerous burden
at the prima facie stage, the court stated plaintiffs need only produce evi-
dence “sufficient to raise the inference that [their] protected activity was
the likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.”122
In applying the lower standard to Dr. Grevious’s claims, the court
held she had produced enough evidence to meet the likely reason stan-
dard on her contract revision claim.123  The court found Dr. Grevious was
116. See id. (stating causal burden under pretext theory is where plaintiff must
convince factfinder employer’s legitimate explanation was false and retaliatory ani-
mus was “real reason” for adverse employment action).  The court also noted it
had previously required a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s retaliatory intent
had a “determinative effect” on the employer’s decision to subject the employee to
an adverse employment action. See id. (citing Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109
F.3d 913, 932 (3d Cir. 1997)).  To prove determinative effect, the plaintiff must
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a ‘but-for’ causal connec-
tion” between the adverse employment action and the retaliatory animus. See id.
(quoting Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 595–96 (3d Cir. 1995)).
117. See id. (“Although this Court’s . . . ‘real reason’ causation standard and
the Supreme Court’s ‘but-for’ causation standard differ in terminology, they are
functionally the same.”).  The Third Circuit notes the terminology differences but
nonetheless makes clear that the Supreme Court has articulated “but-for” causa-
tion as the appropriate standard. See id.  (highlighting similarities between Third
Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s standards that make clear “but-for” causation is ap-
propriate standard).
118. See id. (“Understanding the retaliation plaintiff’s ultimate burden, we
turn to the question of whether that burden differs at the prima facie stage of the
case.  We hold that it does.”).
119. See id. at 259 (describing effect of requiring but-for causation at prima
facie stage of case and agreeing with Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Foster v. Univ. of
Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2015)).
120. See id. (noting burden-shifting framework is tantamount in retaliation
cases and Supreme Court did not explicitly denounce its use in Nassar).
121. See id. (“Consistent with our precedent, a plaintiff alleging retaliation has
a lesser causal burden at the prima facie stage.”).
122. See id. (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173,
177 (3d Cir. 1997)).
123. See id. at 260–61 (addressing Dr. Grevious’s claims and only finding suffi-
cient evidence to support contract revision claim).
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issued a renewable contract and Provost Thompson recommended a ter-
minable contract, despite nothing changing except her filing the EEOC
charge.124  Additionally, the court found the allegations that Provost
Thompson admitted to retaliating against Dr. Grevious supported the in-
ference that retaliation was the likely reason the contract revision oc-
curred.125  Because Dr. Grevious met her burden on the contract revision
claim, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
against the University and Provost Thompson.126  Notwithstanding this de-
cision, because Dr. Grevious was unable to produce enough evidence that
retaliation was the likely reason for her early removal as chairperson, the
Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Dr. Grevious’s chairperson
claim and her claims against Dean Austin.127
IV. PUT YOUR MONEY WHERE YOUR MOUTH IS: CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF RETALIATION CLAIMS
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit’s holding in Carvalho-Grevious places a lesser causal
burden on plaintiffs at the prima facie stage and makes clear that “but-for”
causation is the ultimate burden.128  The decision is favorable to employees
who, under the Third Circuit’s decision, do not have the onerous burden
of proving “but-for” causation before proceeding to trial.129  Although this
124. See id. at 261 (summarizing facts and timing of issued terminable con-
tract to raise inference of retaliatory motive).  The court noted that complaints
against Dr. Grevious existed long before she filed an EEOC charge and despite
these complaints, Provost Thompson still recommended a renewable contract. See
id.  Thus, when Dr. Grevious made her EEOC charge and Provost Thompson reis-
sued her contract, the court found the timing sufficient to create inference of
retaliation. See id.
125. See id. at 262 (noting district court’s dismissal of Dr. Grevious’s state-
ments alleging Provost Thompson admitted to retaliation was in error).  The court
stated that the credibility of statements is for the factfinder alone and should not
be engaged in at the summary judgment stage. See id.
126. See id. at 263 (reasoning evidence supported factual issue regarding em-
ployer’s motivation in issuing terminal contract to Dr. Grevious).
127. See id. at 260, 263 (addressing chairperson claim and claims against Dean
Austin and finding insufficient evidence to conclude retaliation was likely reason
for early removal as chairperson and that Dean Austin had any impact on contract
revision).
128. See id. at 259 (establishing lesser causal burden at prima facie stage and
stating Nassar clarified plaintiffs’ ultimate burden).
129. See Chappell, supra note 18, at 1022 (highlighting impact of Nassar on
burden-shifting framework and arguing “but-for” standard at prima facie stage is
onerous burden for employees).  Arguably, once a plaintiff establishes a prima fa-
cie case and the employer articulates a legitimate business reason for the adverse
action, courts will rely largely on the same evidence from the prima facie case to
see if plaintiff has placed enough doubt on the employer’s reasoning. See Carvalho-
Grevious, 851 F.3d at 262 (relying on evidence from prima facie case because there
is nothing in “but-for” standard that requires using different evidence at different
stages).  Once the plaintiff has surpassed the prima facie case, there is arguably
always going to be an issue of fact regarding the cause of the adverse employment
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part of the court’s decision is clear, the future application of the court’s
“likely reason” standard remains uncertain because it is unique from other
circuit court standards.130  Nonetheless, on its face, the “likely reason”
standard seems favorable to employees and provides some guidance to
both employees and employers in Title VII retaliation litigation.131
A. A Cause in the Chaos: Critical Analysis of Removing “But-For”
at Prima Facie Stage
After Nassar placed a more onerous burden on plaintiffs, the Third
Circuit’s holding in Carvalho-Grevious takes a different turn in Title VII
retaliation claims and provides a victory for plaintiffs.132  By holding plain-
tiffs need not prove “but-for” causation prior to trial, the Third Circuit has
made it easier for plaintiffs to survive motions for summary judgment.133
While plaintiffs must still meet the ultimate burden with “but-for” causa-
tion, they will be able to do so at trial, with a factfinder, rather than having
their cases dismissed prematurely, without an inquiry into material issues
of fact.134
The court’s decision largely advances the spirit of Title VII to protect
employees from discrimination and retaliation in the workplace.135  Title
VII aims to encourage individuals to come forward when they believe em-
action. Cf. id. (stating that, once employer explains legitimate reason for actions,
employee has to demonstrate weaknesses in employer’s reason from which reason-
able jury could infer that employer did not act because of stated reason).  In
Carvalho-Grevious, the court relied on the same evidence used in the prima facie
stage. See id.  Thus, establishing the prima facie case seems to be the biggest hur-
dle because once that is done and an employer articulates a legitimate business
reason, there is a question of fact that must be submitted to the jury. Cf. id. (not-
ing plaintiff must produce evidence that convinces reasonable jury defendant’s
nonretaliatory reason for adverse employment action is not genuine).
130. Compare Bloch, supra note 6, at 242–46 (highlighting other circuit courts’
approaches to standard), with Francis, supra note 11 (noting that it is too soon to
conclude how “likely reason” standard will affect retaliation claims).
131. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (refusing to impose heavier burden
on plaintiff in light of Nassar decision requiring “but-for” causation); see also Chap-
pell, supra note 18, at 1015 (describing Nassar as placing onerous burden on plain-
tiffs in prima facie stage and stating other standards are more favorable to
plaintiffs).
132. See Francis, supra note 11 (asserting Carvalho-Grevious decision makes it
easier for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in Third Circuit).
133. See id. (listing possible implications of lesser causal standard).
134. See id. (noting judgment will be difficult to obtain prior to trial); see also
Semler, supra note 12, at 64–65 (discussing employers’ tactical advantages to hav-
ing cases dismissed prior to reaching trial).
135. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 371–74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing core
of Title VII to be employee-friendly to encourage employees to come forward with-
out fear of retaliation); cf. Francis, supra note 11 (stating Carvalho-Grevious decision
is employee-friendly).
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ployment practices are discriminatory without fear of retaliation.136  Be-
cause plaintiffs with weaker, yet still meritorious claims will be able to
make it to trial, the decision promotes retaliation protection embedded in
Title VII.137  Although plaintiffs still face “but-for” causation at bench or
jury trial, the factfinder is in the best position to find whether plaintiffs’
claims have merit.138  Thus, by providing a lesser causal burden for retalia-
tion plaintiffs at the prima facie stage—and particularly relevant at the
summary judgment stage—the Third Circuit breathes life into the protec-
tion of the retaliation provision.139
Moreover, in determining that Nassar’s standard is “functionally the
same” as proving pretext in the burden-shifting framework, the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision will lead to clarity and efficiency in future retaliation
claims.140  Although Nassar established “but-for” causation as the ultimate
burden for retaliation claims, it nonetheless failed to address the burden-
shifting framework or define the standard for future cases.141  Because the
Third Circuit did not implement this new standard in the prima facie
stage, judges and attorneys will not need to grapple with what evidence
establishes “but-for” causation or its impact on the burden-shifting frame-
work.142  Thus, judges and attorneys in the Third Circuit will be able to
proceed under the same framework rooted in more than forty years of
136. See Chambers, supra note 38, at 1180–81 (commenting on importance of
retaliation provision in Title VII to provide protections for individuals who choose
to engage in actions to protect their own and others’ employment).
137. See Spiggle, supra note 44 (noting lower standard may lead to more cases
making it to trial); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 371, 385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing onerous burden on retaliation plaintiffs contradicts protective nature of
Title VII).
138. See Semler, supra note 12, at 62–64 (describing onerous burdens in bur-
den-shifting framework turn factual questions regarding intent of discrimination
into legal questions at summary judgment).  Semler asserts plaintiffs benefit from
reaching the jury because it may persuade them that the employer’s actual reason
for implementing the adverse employment action was for retaliation. See id. at 62.
139. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing impor-
tance of Title VII retaliation and how an onerous burden would remove protec-
tions from those who report discrimination).  Justice Ginsburg argued that the
Nassar causation standard substantially removes protections for retaliation claims
despite Congress’ attempt to strengthen Title VII. See id. at 384–85 (highlighting
prior case law and statutory amendments that showed Congress’s intention to
broaden causation standard).
140. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 247–48 (stating that if Nassar does not affect
burden-shifting framework, then litigants and judges do not need to change their
approach to retaliation claims and can continue to use “real reason” standard
while still promoting clarity and efficiency).
141. See Todd, supra note 4, at 315 (arguing Nassar’s “but-for” standard cre-
ated confusion and Court failed to clarify standard).
142. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir.
2017) (establishing “likely reason” standard at prima facie stage); see also Todd,
supra note 4, at 312 (arguing “but-for” causation is not simple in employment con-
text and urging Supreme Court to clarify causation standard as it applies strictly to
Title VII and burden-shifting framework).
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precedent.143  While critics may note the decision will lead to “frivolous”
claims ending up at trial, thus wasting judicial resources, the Third Circuit
reasoned that sanctions and certification requirements under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 will prevent attorneys from filing meritless
claims.144
In addition to promoting use of the established burden-shifting
framework, the Third Circuit’s decision promotes fairness.145  Consider-
ing the difficulty plaintiffs have in finding direct evidence of retaliation,
the purpose of the burden-shifting framework is to give plaintiffs an op-
portunity to fairly present their claims beyond a motion for summary
judgement.146  If plaintiffs were required to prove “but-for” causation at
the outset, the functionality and fairness promoted by the burden-shifting
framework would diminish because, without direct evidence, plaintiffs
likely cannot meet such an onerous burden.147  As a result, in harmoniz-
ing the burden-shifting framework with Nassar’s “but for” causation, the
court ensures that plaintiffs lacking a “smoking gun” will continue to have
a fair opportunity to prove their cases with indirect evidence.148
143. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (reasoning burden-shifting frame-
work should not be retired after forty years of use in Title VII litigation); see also
Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249–50 (4th Cir. 2015) (reasoning
Supreme Court did not retire framework and its familiarity is essential to Title VII
retaliation cases); Bloch, supra note 6, at 247 (arguing that if “but-for” makes no
impact on burden-shifting framework, litigants may proceed under familiar frame-
work in retaliation claims).
144. Compare Nassar, 570 U.S. at 358–59 (arguing lower causal burden will
induce frivolous claims and take away resources from EEOC, employer, and courts
to address retaliation claims), and Chappell, supra note 18, at 1019 (arguing Su-
preme Court required higher causal burden to dismiss meritless claims in wake of
rising numbers of retaliation claims filed), with Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259
(arguing FRCP 11’s certification requirement will deter attorneys from filing
claims they know do not establish “but-for” causation). See generally FED. R. CIV. P.
11(b)–(c) (stating requirements in making representations to court and providing
sanctions when rule is violated).
145. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 248 (noting lower threshold of prima facie
case is fair to employee-plaintiffs in retaliation cases).
146. See Ogden, supra note 46, at 186–87 (emphasizing purpose of burden-
shifting framework is to allow plaintiffs to prevail without providing direct evi-
dence of retaliatory animus); see also Semler, supra note 12, at 59–60 (discussing
purpose of burden-shifting framework as providing plaintiffs with opportunity to
“mount an inference of discriminatory motivation”).
147. See Bloch, supra note 6, at 248 (summarizing importance of upholding
burden-shifting framework to promote fairness).
148. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258 (refusing to eliminate burden-shift-
ing framework and reasoning “but-for” causation is established by requirement at
pretext stage); cf. Ogden, supra note 46, at 187 (noting burden-shifting framework
is used by plaintiffs without direct evidence of retaliation); Semler, supra note 12,
at 59–60 (noting most cases involve circumstantial rather than direct evidence of
retaliation thus requiring courts to evaluate claim under burden-shifting
framework).
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B. Testing the Water: Future Applications of the “Likely Reason” Standard
and Advice to Practitioners
Along with holding “but-for” causation is not required at the prima
facie stage, the Third Circuit held, at the prima facie stage, plaintiffs need
only produce evidence that retaliation was the “likely reason” for the ad-
verse employment action.149  However, no other circuit court uses this
standard and the Third Circuit failed to define it, making its application
within the burden-shifting framework difficult to predict.150  Also, the
Third Circuit did not give guidance on what would establish a causal con-
nection that is the “likely reason for the adverse employment action”151
The uncertainty of the new “likely reason” standard is emphasized
through the Third Circuit’s own application in Carvalho-Grevious.152  In
Carvalho-Grevious, the standard appeared to be favorable to Dr. Grevious,
but nevertheless, the standard did not guarantee summary judgment sur-
vival on all of her retaliation claims.153  Specifically, although the court
determined the contract revision claim met the likely reason standard, the
court also found the early removal as chairperson claim did not and, thus,
dismissed the claim.154  Moreover, the first district court to apply the stan-
dard still granted summary judgment for the defendant-employers.155
While uncertainty is on the horizon, practitioners can still prepare them-
selves for potential implications that may result from the Third Circuit’s
decision.156
149. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (establishing new standard re-
quired at prima facie stage of burden-shifting framework).
150. See generally Bloch, supra note 6, at 242–45 (summarizing standards used
by other circuit courts and how courts have addressed burden-shifting framework
post-Nassar).
151. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (establishing standard without dis-
cussing its application or meaning).
152. See id. at 260-62 (applying standard to Dr. Grevious’s claims of
retaliation).
153. See id. at 261 (affirming summary judgment for defendants on Dr. Grevi-
ous’s chairperson claim).
154. See id. (reasoning Dr. Grevious failed to produce evidence that she was
removed as chairperson because she reported Dean Austin for discrimination).
155. See Horvath v. Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, No. CV 15-
668, 2017 WL 1179008, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Horvath v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., No. 17-1968, 2017 WL 5158644 (3d Cir.
July 26, 2017) (reasoning time and proximity were insufficient to establish infer-
ence that retaliation was likely reason for adverse employment action).  The dis-
trict court described the “likely reason” standard as a “relatively light burden.” Id.
Nonetheless, it seems that some courts may still be hesitant to let claims survive
summary judgment in fear of frivolous claims by disgruntled employees. See Univ.
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013) (noting lesser causal
burden will contribute to frivolous filing of claims). But see Carvalho-Grevious, 851
F.3d at 259 (recognizing potential for frivolous claims but arguing FRCP 11 will
deter attorneys from making such claims).
156. For further discussion of practitioner advice, see infra notes 157–86 and
accompanying text.
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1. Fend and Prove: Advice to Practitioners Representing Employees in Title VII
Retaliation Claims
The Third Circuit’s decision lowered the burden on plaintiffs at the
prima facie stage; nevertheless, employees suing employers for retaliation
must remember that the prima facie stage is a burden of production—not
persuasion.157  Accordingly, while plaintiffs may be able to survive sum-
mary judgment, the onerous burden of “but-for” causation awaits at
trial.158  In many cases, courts have even interpreted “but-for” causation to
mean the protected activity was the sole cause of the adverse employment
action.159
In order to meet the high burden of persuasion, plaintiffs’ attorneys
should be mindful of the evidence that is available to make the case.160
Specifically, evidence that may establish the “likely reason” standard, such
as close temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse
employment action, may not be sufficient to establish “but-for” causa-
tion.161  Thus, to meet the most pro-employer view of “but-for” causation,
employee-plaintiffs should collect evidence in addition to close temporal
proximity, such as a pattern of retaliation incidents similar to the plain-
tiff’s or documentation of other issues that were present before the pro-
tected activity occurred but did not lead to any adverse employment
action.162
157. See Dorrian, supra note 81 (asserting prima facie stage burden is one of
production and burden of persuasion is required at pretext stage of burden-shift-
ing framework or at trial).
158. See Chappell, supra note 18, at 1021 (arguing plaintiffs with less onerous
burden at prima facie stage may still find trouble meeting burden at pretext stage
or trial); see also Dorrian, supra note 81 (arguing, despite “but-for” causation’s role
in burden-shifting framework, plaintiffs must at some point establish “but-for” cau-
sation to succeed on retaliation claim); Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 181 (noting
employers are adequately protected from frivolous claims because plaintiffs must
still prove “but-for” causation to succeed at trial).
159. Cf. Todd, supra note 4, at 312 (discussing interpretation of “but-for” cau-
sation as “sole” cause is inappropriate for employment retaliation claims).
160. See Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 170 (arguing since Nassar, courts have
not taken pro-employee stance regarding evidence to prove “but-for” causation
and some courts use Nassar to prevent use of temporal proximity between activity
and employment action).
161. See id. at 157 (discussing difficulty in proving “but-for” causation with
temporal proximity).
162. See id. at 157–61 (summarizing cases using “but-for” causation and lead-
ing to pro-employer decisions); see also Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851
F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting issues with Dr. Grevious University relied
upon in issuing terminal contract were present before protected activity and still
led to issuance and recommendation of renewable contract).  The Third Circuit
stated that Dr. Grevious’s personnel problems from the beginning of her tenure at
the University and the Provost’s continued recommendation to issue a renewable
contract only until Dr. Grevious made complaints of discrimination raised the fac-
tual issue surrounding the real cause of the adverse employment action. See id. at
262–63.
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Another consideration for plaintiffs’ attorneys is the definition of the
“likely reason” standard.163  Without much definition surrounding the
“likely reason” standard, employees should argue it is a relatively low
threshold in order to survive summary judgment.164  Plaintiffs can refer-
ence the Carvalho-Grevious opinion in making this argument because the
court makes clear the burden at the prima facie stage is not meant to be
onerous.165  Additionally, many courts—including the Supreme Court—
have established that making a prima facie case is not meant to be a diffi-
cult task.166  Although it is clear the “likely reason” standard is less oner-
ous than “but-for” causation, plaintiffs should urge courts to interpret the
standard in the least onerous way to survive summary judgment.167
2. Believe It, When You See It: Advice to Practitioners Representing Employers
The lesser causal burden for plaintiffs certainly leads to the possibility
that employers will find it more challenging to secure judgment prior to
trial.168  As a result, employers are exposed to having litigation extended
to trial in the event a plaintiff has a weaker—yet still meritorious—
claim.169  In the event a case goes to trial, employers must then place their
163. See Francis, supra note 11 (stating Third Circuit replaced “but-for” with
new “likely reason” standard and may have implications for future litigants).
164. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (establishing “likely reason” stan-
dard without providing guidance in its application); see also Rosenthal, supra note
46, at 156–70 (describing split amongst courts in evidence establishing “but-for”
causation).  With the new standard announced, it is likely that courts will have to
spend time figuring out what evidence will actually meet the standard. See generally
Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 156–70 (explaining inconsistency amongst courts to
highlight that courts need to determine what the new standard requires).  None-
theless, the guidance from the Third Circuit suggests that it is a relatively low
threshold to meet. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (emphasizing prima facie
case should not be burdensome).
165. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (stating prima facie case should not
be burdensome).  The Third Circuit stated, “[c]onsistent with our precedent, a
plaintiff alleging retaliation has a lesser causal burden at the prima facie stage.” Id.
Thus, the court found it relevant that its precedent holds the burden lower than
the “but-for” causation announced in Nassar. See id.
166. See, e.g., Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(“The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not oner-
ous.”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 171–72 (discussing Supreme Court’s
and circuit courts’ resonating theme that prima facie burden is not difficult to
meet).
167. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (stating “but-for” is higher standard
than is required at prima facie stage); cf. Todd, supra note 4, at 312–15 (discussing
various interpretations of “but for” causation standard after court failed to give
guidance in Nassar).
168. See Francis, supra note 11 (noting possibility Carvalho-Grevious decision
will lead to more plaintiffs surviving summary judgment and proceeding to trial).
169. See id. (emphasizing employers may have difficulty securing judgment
prior to trial and should be prepared with defense).
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fates in the hands of a jury—which can be risky when employers face alle-
gations of discrimination and retaliation.170
With a chance that more cases will proceed to trial, employers should
take steps to protect themselves from juries that may favor injured plain-
tiffs.171  Employers’ attorneys should emphasize the importance of adher-
ing to existing procedures when deciding to terminate employees or alter
employees’ positions in a material way.172  Moreover, attorneys should fo-
cus on compliance with internal protocols and provide documentation of
performance-based reasons leading to employment decisions.173  These
protocols are strengthened with timely work evaluations and substantive,
fair investigations of employees’ behaviors.174  Although the burden is still
“but-for” at trial, it is important that employers not rely on the onerous
burden and dispel any possibility of retaliatory intent with preemptive poli-
cies and procedures.175
Additionally, while the burden on the plaintiff during summary judg-
ment is low, the Third Circuit has shown that not all retaliation claims will
meet that standard.176  Thus, employers can take steps to ensure summary
judgment even in light of the “likely reason” standard.177  Employers can
argue, with the lack of clarity surrounding the standard, the “likely reason”
is a higher burden than the plaintiff has met in any given case.178  In par-
ticular, even Dr. Grevious failed to meet the “likely reason” standard on
her chairperson claim alleging retaliation by Dean Austin.179  Rather than
seeing Carvalho-Grevious as negative authority, employers’ attorneys should
170. See Sherwyn, supra note 44, at 16 (summarizing results from experiment
with juries in employment discrimination and retaliation claims and finding juries
are more likely to rule in favor of plaintiff at trial).
171. See Francis, supra note 11 (advocating for employer precautions in light
of Carvalho-Grevious); see also Keating, supra note 65 (detailing practical steps em-
ployers should take despite Nassar placing higher burden on plaintiffs).
172. See Francis, supra note 11 (listing key takeaways from Carvalho-Grevious
for employers).
173. See id. (providing recommendations for employers in complying with
policies to avoid retaliation claims).
174. See id. (highlighting importance of employee evaluations and properly
conducted investigations); see also Keating, supra note 65 (detailing practical steps
for employers in defending retaliation claims).
175. See Keating, supra note 65 (urging employers to stay vigilant in upholding
antiretaliation policies despite favorable decision in Nassar).
176. See, e.g., Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir.
2017) (finding Dr. Grevious’s chairperson claim did not meet “likely reason”
standard).
177. Cf. id. (finding in favor of employer on chairperson claim under “likely
reason” standard because of extensive documentation showing Dr. Grevious did
not perform well as chairperson).
178. See id. at 259 (establishing “likely reason” standard without providing gui-
dance in its application); see also Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 156–70 (describing
split amongst courts in evidence establishing “but-for” causation).
179. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 260 (affirming summary judgment on
chairperson claim).
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distinguish their cases from the contract revision claim and compare their
cases to the chairperson claim.180  Moreover, the first court to apply the
likely reason standard granted summary judgment in favor of the em-
ployer, reasoning the plaintiff failed to reach the low threshold.181  Thus,
in moving forward, employers’ attorneys can use the uncertainty of the
“likely reason” standard to create a pro-employer interpretation.182
At this point, it is unclear how the “likely reason” standard will play
out in lower courts.183  This includes how the standard will be met, how
frequently employees will survive summary judgment, or how plaintiffs will
fare at trial.184  Nonetheless, on its face, the Third Circuit’s decision ap-
pears pro-employee, and employers should be prepared to face trial more
frequently.185  Even so, employers can rest easy knowing, ultimately, plain-
tiffs will still need to overcome the “but-for” causation hurdle—only a little
later.186
V. CAUSE AND EFFECT: SUMMING UP THE FUTURE OF TITLE VII
RETALIATION IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit’s holding in Carvalho-Grevious established that “but-
for” causation is a plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion.187  In making
this decision, the court also established that, to form a prima facie case,
plaintiffs need only produce enough evidence to show retaliation was the
“likely reason” for an adverse employment action.188  Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Nassar, many critics have noted that Title VII has
180. See id. (discussing evidence that failed to establish “likely reason” stan-
dard on chairperson claim including idea that temporal proximity, by itself, is in-
sufficient to prove causation).
181. See Horvath v. Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, No. CV 15-
668, 2017 WL 1179008, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Horvath v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., No. 17-1968, 2017 WL 5158644 (3d Cir.
July 26, 2017) (reasoning time and proximity were insufficient to establish infer-
ence that retaliation was likely reason for adverse employment action).
182. See Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 156–70 (describing different interpreta-
tions of standard).
183. See Francis, supra note 11 (noting uncertainty to come from Carvalho-
Grevious decision).
184. See id. (stating frequency of cases surviving summary judgment is un-
known in light of new “likely reason” standard).
185. See id. (stating possibility employers may face trial more frequently with
lesser causal burden at prima facie stage and summary judgment).
186. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir.
2017) (discussing plaintiff’s ultimate burden in retaliation claim is “but-for” causa-
tion); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (estab-
lishing causation standard in Title VII claims as “but-for” causation); Rosenthal,
supra note 46, at 175 (arguing Nassar established plaintiff’s ultimate burden rather
than burden at prima facie stage).
187. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 257 (noting ultimate burden of persua-
sion is “but-for” causation announced in Nassar).
188. See id. at 259 (holding causation standard is whether plaintiff shows retal-
iation was “likely reason” for adverse employment action).
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swayed towards a pro-employer scheme.189  The Third Circuit’s decision
swings the pendulum back to plaintiff-employees providing a lesser causal
burden at the prima facie stage, before reaching trial.190
Even with a pro-employee decision, the application of the new “likely
reason” standard remains uncertain.191  As practitioners face Title VII re-
taliation claims in the future, they must prepare for some ambiguity but
argue for an application that best favors their clients.192  Additionally, in
lending another interpretation of Nassar’s effect on the burden-shifting
framework, the Third Circuit may just cause the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to a retaliation claim based on the burden-shifting framework
and clarify the appropriate standard.193  But, for now, practitioners in the
Third Circuit may need to take a taste of the new “likely reason” pudding
to figure out just what proof is needed for a successful retaliation case.194
189. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 364, 385–86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating ma-
jority’s decision takes force out of the protections in Title VII and will reduce num-
ber of retaliation claims filed against employers); see also Chambers, supra note 38,
at 1186–87 (describing Supreme Court’s opportunity to broaden Title VII but
choosing to narrow protection for plaintiffs); Rosenthal, supra note 46, at 145 (stat-
ing Nassar made establishing prima facie case more difficult for plaintiffs); Valenti,
supra note 13, at 120 (noting Nassar signaled changed from Title VII’s employee-
friendly scheme).
190. See Francis, supra note 11 (noting Third Circuit’s decision establishes
lesser causal burden makes it easier for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment); see
also Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (refusing to impose higher causal burden on
plaintiffs in retaliation claims).
191. See Francis, supra note 11 (stating Carvalho-Grevious decided too recently
to determine “likely reason” standard’s effect on retaliation claims, summary judg-
ment, and settlements); see also Todd, supra note 4, at 304–12 (discussing failure of
Supreme Court to define “but-for” causation standard and differences in applying
standard throughout circuit courts). Compare Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259
(establishing “likely reason” standard and finding plaintiff met standard in one
retaliation claim but did not in other retaliation claim), with Horvath v. Urban
Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, No. CV 15-668, 2017 WL 1179008, at *2 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Horvath v. Urban Redevelopment
Auth., No. 17-1968, 2017 WL 5158644 (3d Cir. July 26, 2017) (finding plaintiff did
not meet likely reason standard).
192. For a discussion of practitioner advice in interpreting “likely reason”
standard, see supra notes 157–86 and accompanying text.
193. See Lederman, supra note 70 (noting circuit split and Third Circuit’s con-
tribution may increase chance Supreme Court will review issue in future); see also
Bloch, supra note 6, at 242 (discussing differing standards applying Nassar to bur-
den-shifting framework from circuit courts); Todd, supra note 4, at 312 (noting
causation “conundrum” in Title VII retaliation claims since Nassar).
194. See Proof is in the Pudding, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefree
dictionary.com/proof+is+in+the+pudding [https://perma.cc/WM8Q-BDCC] (last
visited Nov. 15, 2018) (explaining meaning of “proof is in the pudding”).  The
“proof is in the pudding” means to wait and review the results of your efforts
before finding success. See id.  For further discussion of how practitioners can ar-
gue favorable interpretations of the Third Circuit’s new “likely reason” standard,
see supra notes 157–86 and accompanying text.
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